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Abstract Policymakers and other interested parties frequently request information
on the recreational value of a Jish. Although fishing valuation studies date back at
least 25 years, most studies focus on the average value of a fish. If the purpose of
such estimates is to measure the value of incremental changes in fish nurnbers, then
use of average estimates may lead to an incorrect policy decisions. The objective of
this analysis is to estimate the marginal value of a steelhead trout in a recreational
fishery on the John Day River of Oregon. The study uses contingent valuation
procedures to elicit willingness to pay estimates for improvements in fish numbers
and success rates. For the anglers in this survey, the value of an additional steelhead
is $6.65 under current catch conditions. This value is much lower than values
currently used in public debates in the Pacific Northwest, but similar to some
marginal values reported in the recent literature. Implications of these values relative
to average values are discussed.
Introduction
Here is no sentiment, no contest, no grandeur, no economics. From the
sanctity of this occupation, a man may emerge refreshed and in control of his
own soul. He is not idle. He is fishing, alone with himself in dignity and
peace. It seems a very precious thing to me.
John Steinbeck (1954)
Few would question Steinbeck's belief that recreational fishing is an enriching experi-
ence. Indeed, fishing is one of the fastest-growing recreational activities in the United
States. As the demand for recreational fishing increases, policymakers and other inter-
ested parties frequently request information on the value of the fishing experience, and
even values for each fish caught. The latter type of information is needed in addressing
issues of habitat investments, water allocations, and other factors that influence fish
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populations. In the Pacific Northwest, values per fish often enter into deliberations
concerning the benefits and costs of meeting judicially and legislatively mandated in-
creases in anadromous fish populations to mitigate for hydroelectric projects.
Interest in estimating the value of recreational fishing dates back at least 25 years
(Brown et al., 1964). Although most studies, particularly those based on travel cost
procedures, provide estimates of average values for fishing experiences, there is limited
research on the value of incremental changes in fish numbers or fish catch (recent
exceptions include Brown and Mendelsohn (1984), Samples and Bishop (1985), Ca-
meron and James (1987), and Loomis (1988). Not surprisingly then, policymakers and
others have attempted (incorrectly) to derive marginal values by dividing consumer
surplus estimates for the total recreation experience by numbers of fish caught (see, e.g.,
Scott et al. 1987). The resultant estimates, often "transferred" by policy analysts from
the specific sites at which they were estimated to other settings, potentially overstate the
marginal as well as the average value of a fish. The net effect of using these "average"
values for marginal values in policy decisions is readily apparent—a likely misallocation
of resources when dealing with alternative habitat enhancement projects.
The overall objective of this analysis is to estimate the marginal value of a steelhead
trout (Salmo gairdneri) in an important recreational fishery in the Columbia River Basin
of Oregon and Washington. Specifically, the study focuses on the recreational value of
incremental changes in steelhead catch rates on the John Day River of northcentral
Oregon, a fishery characterized by an entirely self-sustaining stock of steelhead trout.
The river basin is experiencing habitat investments designed to mitigate for habitat losses
in the Columbia River. Previous decisions to invest in specific habitat or other enhance-
ment programs have been based on values per fish derived from extant studies. The
results of this analysis are intended to provide a more accurate measure of the marginal
value of a sport caught steelhead in this setting.
Background
Over the last three decades, several methodologies have arisen to circumvent the lack of
market data for public goods by either indirectly imputing a price to the good in question
or by directly querying consumers as to their willingness to pay (WTP) for stated provi-
sions of the good in question. The former approach is exemplified by the travel cost
method (TCM), whereas the latter approach is the contingent valuation method (CVM).
Since the TCM utilizes actual market behavior (i.e., observed visitation rates and
expenditures), it is often preferred over CVM techniques structured around hypothetical
markets. Samples and Bishop (1985) successfully use the multiple-site travel cost
method in estimating the value of variations in anglers' success rates for salmon and
trout sportfishing on Lake Michigan. Strong data requirements, however, may preclude
a similar use of the TCM to estimate marginal values on other recreational fisheries.
Specifically, the TCM requires that recreationists know the fishing quality prior to visit-
ing a site and that this knowledge translates into changes in observable behavior. Unfor-
tunately, in many settings these requirements may not be met. A second drawback hinges
on the TCM's treatment of fishing quality as an exogenously produced attribute of the
fishing trip.' In reality, fishing quality is rarely entirely endogenous or exogenous, but is
instead a combination. This is evidenced by observed variations in success rates across
individuals at the same site. Individuals may alter their success rates by purchasing
variable and fixed inputs such as equipment, bait, guides, or by renting a boat. BenefitsMarginal Value of a Fish 45
arise when public policies or actions increase stock levels and lower the marginal cost of
catching a fish.
When a particular resource setting is not amenable to the TCM, the CVM may be an
appropriate methodology for deriving marginal value estimates. An important aspect of
CVM is the user-defined contingency market, that is, a hypothetical market partially
defined by the respondents' own experience and skill levels. Such a market allows the
incorporation of both exogenous and endogenous components of fishing quality.
Whereas the hypothetical nature of CVM markets expands the range of environmen-
tal goods and services that can be valued, it also has the potential for introducing numer-
ous biases. Consequently, the CVM has generated much debate, as evidenced by the
large volume of literature pertaining to its potential weaknesses. Cummings et al.
(1986), in an extensive review of the CVM, are generally positive with regards to the
use of the CVM as a valuation procedure. More detailed discussions of this technique
are found in Cummings et al. (1986) and Mitchell and Carson (1989).
Theoretical Basis
To convey the theoretical basis underlying the contingent valuation method, we begin by
noting that an angler's success rate, S, is determined by both exogenous and endogenous
factors:
S = S(F,W,Q) (1)
where F is the (exogenously given) fishery stock level, W is a vector of other exogenous
factors infiuencing the success rate (such as stream conditions, fishing regulations, and
weather), and Q is a vector of goods and services purchased by the individual that are
used as inputs in producing a fishing trip (such as fishing equipment and guide services).
The angler's optimization problem is to
Max U [S(F,W,Q),Z,X] (2a)
subject to
(PQ * Q) -H (PX * X) < Y (2b)
where U(-) is the angler's utility function, Z is the vector of factors that infiuence
the quality of the angling experience (e.g., scenery and congestion), X is a vector
of other goods, PQ and Px are the price vectors associated with Q and X, respectively,
and Y is angler income.
The indirect utility function associated with (2) is specified as
V° = V(P°Q, P°x, F°, W°, Z°, Y°). (3)
V(-) gives the maximum utility attainable given the current level of prices, exogenous
inputs, and angler income. The success rate does not directly enter into (3). Instead, it is
determined by the other parameters. If success rates were exogenously determined, F°
and W would be replaced by S°, yielding essentially the same specification as em-
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penditure function E, where E° = E(P°Q, P°X, F°, W°, Z°, V°). This gives the
minimum expenditure necessary to achieve utility level V°.
Public agencies can increase angler benefits by investing in stock enhancement pro-
jects, or by altering elements of W and Z under their control. For example, fishing
regulations may be relaxed to allow larger daily limits or access to an especially scenic
section of a river may be improved. This latter improvement may yield benefits both by
increasing the aesthetic value of a fishing trip and by lowering transportation costs. The
research described here is limited to the benefits arising from a change in success rates.
Since the marginal value of a steelhead is required when evaluating the benefits arising
from habitat improvement projects, we assume that these success improvements arise via
an increase in stock levels.
Hicks (1943) defines four measures of welfare changes: compensating variation,
equivalent variation, compensating surplus, and equivalent surplus. The compensating
measures are defined as the amount of compensation, paid or received, that will main-
tain the individual at his initial utility level, Vo, given that the individual is allowed to
adjust his consumption bundle after the change. The equivalent measures are similarly
defined using the postchange utility level as the frame of reference. In the context of the
CVM, these values are expressed as either the respondents' willingness-to-pay (WTP) or
willingness-to-accept (WTA) to face or forego stated hypothetical changes. Without ex-
ploring the arguments as to which measure is theoretically correct, WTP values have
been shown to give more consistent estimates and are thus preferred for most CVM
applications (Mitchell and Carson 1988).
For valuing increments in quality, WTP corresponds to the Hicksian compensating
variation, CV. Letting F' denote the new stock level, the following relation holds:
, P°x, F°, W°, Z°, Y°) = V(P°Q, P°x, F', W°, Z°, Y° - CV) = V° (4)
or in terms of the expenditure function,
CV = E(P°Q, P°x, F°, W°, Z°, V°) = E(P°Q, P°x, F', W°, Z°, V°) (5)
Expression (5) is graphically presented as a bid curve in Fig. 1. F° represents stock
levels under current conditions. The vertical axis measures the compensation necessary
to maintain the angler at this initial utility level given changes in the stock level. For
example, WTPc(-l-) represents the angler's willingness to pay (Hicksian compensating
variation) to enjoy an increment in the stock level from F° to F*. Similarly, WTAc(-)
represents the compensation the angler would demand to voluntarily face a lower stock
level, F~. Aggregate benefits can be derived by vertically summing individual bid
curves (Bradford 1970).
The thrust of the contingent valuation method is to construct a market in which the
above individual can "buy" an increment or "sell" a decrement of the good. Bidding
games, open-ended questions, and closed-ended dichotomous choice questions are the
standard formats for these markets. In an attempt to more accurately simulate real
markets, the closed-ended dichotomous choice approach offers a "take it or leave it"
price for the good. These yes/no answers can then be analyzed in a discrete choice
model such as the logit. Recent developments by Cameron and James (1987) expand the
usefulness of these "closed-ended" answers and allow estimation of the marginal value






Figure 1 An individual angler's bid curve for change in stock levels.
An Empirical Application
Study Area
The empirical setting for this study is the John Day River of northcentral Oregon. A
major tributary of the Columbia River, the John Day River basin encompasses 8,010
square miles in the northcentral part of the state, ranging in elevation from 150 feet
above sea level at the mouth of the John Day River to 9,038 feet on Strawberry Moun-
tain. The basin supports the largest runs of wild spring chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus
tshawytcha) and summer steelhead in eastem Oregon (ODFW 1985). Decrease in sum-
mer flows due to riparian damage, coupled with the basin's semiarid climate, have
exacerbated potential conflicts between instream and out-of-stream water users during
the critical summer flow period. The basin's economy, largely centered around agricul-
ture and livestock production, heightens the need for reliable data on the value of in-
stream water, of which the production of salmon and steelhead are one component. This
topic is explored in more detail in Johnson and Adams (1988).
Questionnaire Design
The CV questionnaire was designed and pretested on the Alsea River salmon fishery in
August and September 1986. The main body of the questionnaire was devoted to collect-
ing the angler's willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) values for
stated increments or decrements in fishing quality. The procedure used to elicit WTP
values for improvements in the fishing quality was as follows. First, given information
on the average success rate on the John Day River in each of the preceding five years,
the angler was asked to state his expected catch rate on the John Daiy in an average year.
This gave a base level of fishing quality on which to construct the contingent market.48 N. S. Johnson and R. M. Adams
The respondent was then told that there were three postulated increases in the number of
steelhead in the river: 33%, 67%, and 100% above the average level. The focus on
benefits for improvements above the current angler success level is motivated by the
Northwest Power Planning Council's stated objective of doubling Columbia River fish
runs and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife's goal of increasing average John
Day steelhead production from the current escapement level of 15,000 adults to 23,000
(ODFW 1985). Under each of these improvement levels, the respondent was asked to
state his new expected catch rate. This format allowed the angler to define the contingent
market such that it reflected his own skill and experience level.
Once the contingent market was defined the respondent was asked the following
questions:
21 A. If improvement A takes place would you be willing to pay $
for a John Day Steelhead Stamp? YES NO
2IB: What would be the maximum fee you would be willing to pay?
$
Question 21A was stated in a dichotomous choice fashion for two reasons. First, it more
accurately reflects the real marketplace for fish and wildlife stamps, a market with which
anglers are already familiar. Second, it facilitates fitting a dichotomous choice model to
the data, allowing estimation of expected WTPc for improvement A (see Cameron and
James 1987). The proposed stamp fee levels, ranging from $2 to $24, were systemati-
cally assigned prior to each week's surveying. A questionnaire was then randomly se-
lected prior to each interview.
Several possible sources of bias need to be noted at this point. First, following the
closed-ended question with an open-ended form introduces the possibility of respondents
"anchoring" on the proposed fee level. This "anchoring bias" is conceptually analo-
gous to starting point bias in iterative bidding formats. In addition, two open-ended
questions eliciting WTPe and WTAc for decrements in fishing quality had already been
posed, introducing an additional source of anchoring. Another bias may be attached to
the use of a "John Day Steelhead Stamp" as the payment vehicle. These biases are
further discussed later.
Question 2IB and all subsequent WTPc questions were stated in an open-ended
fashion:
22A: Now suppose that, instead of improvement A taking place, improve-
ment B occurs. What would be the maximum ADDITIONAL amount you
would be willing to pay for the stamp for this additional improvement from
A to B? $
Under each improvement level the respondent was also asked to reveal his expected
change in hours spent fishing and in the number of fishing trips taken to the John Day
annually. If there was an increase (decrease) in either of these, the respondent was asked
from what activity he would take this time (or what he would do with this extra time).
The intent of these questions was to collect information on substitute activities and to
examine the possibility of increased fishing pressure and congestion, which might nega-
tively impact the fishery and hence lower individual benefits.
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1986-1987 fishing season. Five other anglers declined to be interviewed, resulting in an
acceptance rate of 93 percent. Administering the survey took 15-30 minutes each. Five
surveys were deemed unusable due to key questions that remained unanswered. The
question eliciting the respondent's expected catch rate under each improvement level
posed the most difficulty. Failure to answer this question resulted in an undefmed contin-
gent market.
Analysis of Data
Prior to estimating willingness-to-pay values for the postulated improvement levels, the
data were examined for evidence of anchoring and payment vehicle biases.
Anchoring bias. The usual test for anchoring, or starting point, bias is to regress the final
bid values against the originally offered price (or compensation, in WTA questions)
(Boyle et al. 1985). Utilizing this test the following relationship was obtained:
WTPc(A) = 9.58 - 0.10 FEE
(4.09) (-0.35) (6)
where WTPc(A) is the open-ended bid response for improvement A (question # 2 IB)
and FEE is the proposed stamp fee in the preceding dichotomous choice question (#
21A). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Using this procedure, we fail to
reject the null hypothesis of no anchoring bias. As noted earlier, however, a prior
question had elicited the respondent's willingness-to-pay, WTPe(-), to avoid a decline
in the success rate. Including this bid as an explanatory variable and retesting for anchor-
ing bias produces the following:
WTPc(A) 0.37 + 0.21 FEE + 0.97 WTPe(-)
(-0.24) (0.124) (0.046) (7)
Given the t-statistic of 1.69 on FEE in this case, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the
.10 significance level.^ According to Freeman (in Cummings et al. 1986), anchoring on
offered prices may not "bias" results as long as the mean of the offered bids is close to
the true mean WTR The mean of FEE is $10.32, whereas the mean WTPc(A) bid is
$8.58. Thus if anchoring bias exists, its effect will be in a slight upward bias of
WTPc(A) in this case. From the coefficient on WTPe(-), it is evident that respondents
based their WTPc(A) bid on their prior bid. This is not unexpected; given an angler (or
consumer) with certain tastes and preferences, it is likely that he would place similar
value on marginal increments or decrements in quality (or quantity).
Payment vehicle bias. Prior CVM studies of recreation benefits, such as Daubert and
Young (1981), have adopted the practice of throwing out "protest" bids. These are
either zero WTP or large WTA bids that were felt to be protests against either the
payment vehicle or the contingent market in general. This was not done in this study
even though 9 of the 62 usable questionnaires had zero WTPc bids for improvement A.
There are several reasons for not excluding these zero bids. First, recall that respondents
were allowed to define the contingent market to reflect their own skill and experience
level. Three of the zero bids can be explained by noting that these anglers did not expectso N. S. Johnson and R. M. Adams
a 33% increase in the stock level to change their success rate. Two other respondents
expressing zero bids expected to catch at least 10 steelhead in an average year given
current condition. Since anglers face a 10-steelhead per year and 2-steelhead per day
catch limit in northeastern Oregon, these anglers may merely be expressing the effect of
this catch limit constraint. This also raises the possibility that significant benefits may
arise by relaxing current catch limits. Finally, it is interesting to note that four of the nine
respondents giving zero bids for improvement A later gave nonzero bids for improve-
ment levels B or C. Zero or low bids may partially refiect the uncertainty respondents
attach to small expected improvements.
Whereas the above explanations can rationalize eight of the nine "protest" bids, it is
likely that these bids, as well as other low bids, partially reflect the respondents' feelings
towards a "John Day Steelhead Stamp." This type of reaction has been termed "pay-
ment vehicle bias" in the CVM literature. The broad use of this terminology is rather
unfortunate. As noted by both Arrow and Kahneman (in Cummings et al. 1986), prefer-
ences are sensitive to the social arrangement within which payments are to take place.
Thus it is rational for different payment vehicles to yield different WTP values. True
payment vehicle bias exists only insofar as the "wrong" payment vehicle is selected for
a particular study, and this misspecification leads to different WTP responses compared
to the "true" payment vehicle.
In response to the above observations, Cummings et al. (1986) suggest considering
"... what payment vehicle would most likely be employed, in fact, if the commodity
were to be provided?" (Cummings et al. 1986, p. 210). Many investments in fishery
enhancement in the Pacific Northwest are judicially or legislatively mandated to com-
pensate for damages caused by Columbia River hydroelectric projects. Consumers will
ultimately pay for these improvements via higher utility bills. Consequently, a utility bill
payment vehicle may have been more appropriate. It should be noted, however, that the
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) takes an active role in implementing
habitat improvements. In postinterview discussions with several respondents, it was
learned that many local anglers did not hold high opinions of ODFW. Much of this
sentiment arose out of an incident in September 1982. While poisoning sections of the
John Day River to eliminate trash fish, ODFW accidentally killed many early returning
steelhead. Use of a steelhead stamp as the payment vehicle appears to have captured
respondents' feelings toward ODFW with respect to this, and other, incidents. In retro-
spect, a more realistic approach would have been to use a utility bill payment vehicle
combined with a clear statement of which state and federal agencies would be responsi-
ble for implementing the proposed habitat improvement projects. The effect of this
survey instrument misspecification is purely conjectural but is felt to have resulted in a
downward bias in WTPc values, given how habitat improvements are currently imple-
mented and funded.
Computation of Witlingness-to-Pay
Aggregate bid method. The derivation of estimates for expected willingness-to-pay for
improvements in fishing quality follows the procedures of Brookshire et al. (1980). A
total bid curve is obtained by aggregating individual bid curves. Since the entire popula-
tion of (potential) John Day steelhead anglers was not sampled, we instead use the mean
bid and quality levels to arrive at a mean individual bid curve. An important issue arises
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often is more likely to be included in the survey. This angler may also place a higher
value on an increase in quality due to the quality/quantity interaction. At the same time,
he may be nearer his seasonal limit (10 steelhead in northeastern Oregon) and conse-
quently not value an increase in seasonal catch as highly as someone who catches only
one or two steelhead per year. In attempts to test for this, no significant difference could
be found between bids from frequent and infrequent John Day anglers. Hence, no adjust-
ment was made in calculating the mean bids.
The mean bid curve is graphically presented in Figure 2, where quality is repre-
sented as hours per steelhead. This curve can be represented by a quadratic functional
form:
WTPc= 0.27 + 4.12 A HRSFISH - 0.32 (A HRSFISH)^ N
(1.22) (0.91) (0.14) (8)
where A HRSFISH is the improvement in the success rate (hours per steelhead). The
values in parentheses are standard errors; the adjusted R^ is approximately 0.95. A
constant term was included since the current success level was included as an observa-
tion (i.e., WTPc = 0, A HRS = 0).
The Marginal Value of a Steelhead
As alluded to by Steinbeck, there is more to fishing than catching fish. This point was
illustrated by two of the questions posed during the survey. When asked at what catch
rate anglers would stop fishing on the John Day River, 45% reported that they would
continue to fish even if they never caught a fish; 12% reported that they did not expect to














2.9 (" (Hours per Steelhead)
(A) (B) (C) (Stock Level)
Figure 2 Mean individual bid curve for improvements in stock levels and success rates.52 N. S. Johnson and R. M. Adams
additional steelhead will increase the value of a fishing experience. Our concern is with
what this additional fish is worth. This will depend on both the catch rate at which it is
measured and whose marginal value is measured. For policy purposes, the average
marginal value of a steelhead is appropriate. This can be calculated from Eq. (8) in
combination with an estimate of average annual angler effort. From survey responses,
the average John Day steelhead angler spends approximately 39 hours per year fishing
and catches approximately 4.2 steelhead in a season. To catch an additional steelhead
requires an improvement-in-success rate to 7.5 hours per steelhead (from the base level
9.3 hours per steelhead). Eq. (8) gives the average willingness-to-pay for such an in-
crease in success rate as $6.65. Hence, one may infer that the average value of an
additional steelhead during the fishing season is $6.65 under current average catch
conditions. These values reflect only net benefits accruing to users of the resource.
Estimation of nonuse benefits, such as increased existence or bequest values, was not
attempted in the present study.
Currently, policy analysts in the Northwest tend to use a much higher value for
salmon and steelhead than those reported here. Scott et al. (1987), for example, use
$166.22 as the average economic value of a sport caught steelhead. This value was
derived by dividing consumer surplus per fishing day (from Brown et al. 1980 as modi-
fied by Meyer Resources 1982) by catch per day of fishing effort. As acknowledged by
Scott et al., ". . . the average consumer surplus per fish obtained in this manner is
greater than the marginal increase in consumer surplus that would be obtained from an
increase in catch." No mention is made of how much higher these values are.
It should be noted that there is no one correct value that can be used as "the"
marginal value offish. Values will vary by species, location, fishery quality, and angling
method employed. Still, several recent studies lend credibility to the notion that values
currently used for policy analysis regarding salmon and steelhead may be upper bounds.
For example, Samples and Bishop (1985), utilizing a multiple-site travel cost model,
estimated the average value of an additional sport-caught salmon or trout in the Lake
Michigan sportfishery (mainly troll fishing) as approximately $10.25 (expressed in 1987
dollars). The base level of success was 0.47 fish per trip.
A second study, conducted by Loomis (1988), also employed a regional multiple-site
travel cost demand model to estimate marginal values for salmon and steelhead caught in
coastal freshwater and ocean fisheries of Oregon and Washington. An improvement in
Loomis' methodology over that employed by Samples and Bishop is that it allows esti-
mation of site-specific fish values. Estimated steelhead values, for example, ranged from
$23 (1984 $s) for the Alsea River to $103 for the Nestucca River. Salmon values varied
from $7.48 for the Alsea River to $64.61 for ocean fishing originating from the Port of
Tillamook. Unfortunately, no reference success rates were reported for these values.
A subtle difference in how Loomis defines his marginal values compared to the
definition used in this study is worth pointing out. In calculating the marginal value per
fish, Loomis divides the incremental increase in consumer surplus by the change in fish
catch, where fish catch is defined as fish caught and kept. The approach used in this
study is similar but does not distinguish between fish caught and kept vs. those caught
and released. This leads to a divergence in what is actually being measured, with
Loomis' definition yielding higher values except in special cases where anglers are
constrained to keep all fish caught. With data on catch-and-release percentages, it would
be possible to more accurately compare estimates obtained from the two definitions.
A third supporting study was based on a survey conducted in 1984 by Cameron and
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fitted a qualitative choice model to responses from a "closed-ended" contingent valua-
tion survey. The marginal value of a chinook salmon (caught and kept) was estimated as
$14.47 (1984 Canadian $'s), whereas negative values were obtained for coho salmon.
The coho values would appear to be incorrect unless one remembers that, in the fishery
studied, anglers face a per-day catch limit and chinook are, in general, the more pre-
ferred fish of the two species. If an angler perceives that keeping a coho (perhaps early
in the fishing trip) later lowers the number of chinook that can potentially be kept, their
utility may be lowered. This again illustrates that the nature of catch limits and other
restrictions may affect benefit estimates.
This study confirms other recent analyses that the marginal value of salmon and
steelhead to recreational anglers may be lower than values currently used in policy
decisions.' This implies that fisheries managers and policymakers may be overvaluing
some benefits arising from anadromous fish enhancement projects, with a resultant inef-
ficient allocation of public funds. This conclusion, however, must be tempered by the
realization that many enhancement projects arise from legally mandated mitigation for
fishery losses suffered due to hydroelectric project or for restoration of native American
fishery rights. Also, nonuse values may be of interest. Still, an attempt should be made
to clearly define and substantiate benefit estimates employed in specific project analyses.
Concluding Comments
Numerous assessments of the value of recreational fishing, based largely on the travel
cost method, have been used to infer a value per fish by dividing total consumer surplus
for a fishery by the number of fish caught. For theoretical and empirical reasons, use of
these values as measures of marginal value is inappropriate. Nonetheless, such values
have been widely used in "benefits transfer" exercises and in policy debates. The
present study estimated the value of incremental improvements in a steelhead fishery and
from that, the value of an additional sport caught steelhead. This value is substantially
below values currently used in policy decisions but is similar to some recent estimates
for anadromous fish in other areas. If policy decisions are to be based on marginal
values, analysts need to understand the differences between the average values in the
literature and marginal values. Failure to distinguish portends misallocation of scarce
wildlife habitat resources.
The contingent valuation methodology is the most appropriate technique for the
steelhead fishery being valued here. Whereas CVM suffers from numerous drawbacks,
none proved to be severely limiting. The main "bias" observed was related to the use of
a "John Day Steelhead Stamp" as a payment vehicle. However, the purpose of this
study was not to establish what anglers would pay to bring about an improvement.
Rather, it was to estimate how much better off anglers would be if an improvement did
occur. The negative response observed in some bids due to this payment method may
have contributed to a downward bias of this estimate.
Further research into the use of user-defined CVM markets may prove successful in
decreasing hypothetical bias. Allowing respondents to define key components of the
market appears especially fruitful where actual or perceived quality varies across indi-
viduals. Given the problems associated with payment vehicle "bias," a user-defined
payment vehicle may also be worthwhile. This would be relevant for studies whose
purpose is not to set optimal or revenue-maximizing fee levels but to obtain a general
measure of consumer surplus generated by an increase in recreation quality.54 N. S. Johnson and R. M. Adams
Further research could also be expended on identifying the components of an angling
experience. Anglers rarely base the total value of their angling experience on the number
offish caught, i.e., other aspects of the trip also have value. Focusing exclusively on the
catch rate component when considering a policy designed to increase the value of a
fishery ignores other attributes that contribute to net benefits. Generalizing such benefit
assessments to the full set of experiences requires more data than is typically collected in
such analyses. The closed-ended valuation techniques of Cameron and James (1987)
may prove useful in this endeavor.
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Notes
1. This is in contrast to a third valuation procedure's (the household production function
approach) treatment of fishing quality as an endogenously produced attribute.
2. Boyle et al. (1985) also found evidence of starting point bias in three CVM studies. The
effect of the biases found appears small. The severity of this bias will vary case by case and is
heavily dependent on the design of the survey instrument, as well as respondents' familiarity with
the good or amenity being values. See Cummings et al. (1986) or Mitchell and Carson (1989) for
further discussion.
3. An analysis of elk hunting in Arizona (Cory and Martin, 1985) also revealed values for an
additional elk to be well below those frequently used in habitat or management decisions.
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